Conceptually, Global Matrix advances in a systematic and structured inter-disciplinary (matrix) framework a research agenda for examining the stance of major world actors on the key policy dimensions to world politics (political ideologies, economics, migration, climate change, security and world view); drawing out evidence of cross-cutting linkages (between sectors and among major actors); and evaluating the evolution and adequacy of existing multilateral institutions in relation to the emerging multi-polarity, and formulating recommendations.
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Global Matrix
A conceptual and organisational framework for researching the future of global governance
Aim of the network
Global Matrix proposes to address world governance issues at the systemic level. The overarching question is whether the emerging multi-polar constellation is likely to prove stable and cooperative, or to reveal an inherent instability. The originality of the project is its structured inter-disciplinary (matrix) framework for examining the key dimensions to world politics.
The agenda to be researched is manifestly ambitious, and so the project has set realistic objectives, which are:
• To establish a robust analytical framework for addressing the major policy issues surrounding the future of global governance at the systemic level, and advance the state of the art in think tank research in a set of policy domains.
• To test how far a group of independent and globally representative think tanks can form common views on the major issues, and undertake a constructive `shadowing` of the official G20 and other global summitry processes in real time.
• To establish a sustainable and semi-institutionalised network of research centres at the global level, and thus contribute to the policy-shaping activity of the transnational nonstate sector on global governance issues.
The overarching substantive questions at the global level are:
• With the evident emergence, or re-emergence of multiple major powers in the world, what is the systemic and paradigmatic nature of the new constellation that develops?
• Does this new constellation merit the description of an order? Where does it lie in the spectrum between a new balance-of-power system without global hegemon, versus a world order in which international law and multilateral institutions become increasingly important alongside the pervasive influence of non-governmental transnational forces and actors?
• If a new balance-of-power constellation becomes a dominant characteristic of the current tendencies, how should one assess warnings that this 'system' may become unstable and dangerous for world peace, as in earlier historical episodes?
• Or, does this extrapolation of the past ignore the rise of new transnational forces and multilateral institutions, themselves the product of globalisation and interdependence, which may constrain the major powers to move towards a more normative world order? But in this case, what will be the normative foundations of this order, how will they be set, particularly as between democratic and non-democratic regimes, and what part will non-state actors play in the process?
To be tractable, the project breaks down these overarching questions about the world system into six major 'sectors' of policy, and the more precise issues at this level are set out in relevant sections below.
A large body of work exists on multilateralism, much of it reflecting the original meaning of multilateral as the opposite of unilateral or bilateral. 1 The most developed scholarship on the topic probes the utility of multilateral norms or organisations. 2 Yet, multilateralism is conceived and used in different ways by political actors, often to serve their own narrow purposes. 3 The rise of Asia is leading into a rich debate over the future of the international system with realist approaches warning over the inherent instability of the transition from a hegemonic unipolar/bipolar system 4 to a multi-polar/non-polar 5 /or inter-polar 6 world; and whether this stands to imperil the multilateral order or contribute to it. Support for a pessimistic view is seen in current failures of global governance (e.g. over UN Security Council reform, the WTO Doha Round, climate change in the context of the UNFCCC, etc.). Is there an inherent inconsistency between multi-polarity and multilateralism?
As regards the EU, the Lisbon Treaty resolves in principle to raise its level of ambition in the field of foreign and security policy to that of a major world actor. 7 While the Treaty endorses a set of norms, values and principles to frame its external policy, these are not always consistent with its practice, 8 and they also stand uneasily alongside the different philosophies and power endowments of other actors. 9 But the challenge of working out what an 'effective multilateralism' could comprise has to be the equal responsibility of all global actors.
Methodological and analytical approach
The approach is multi-disciplinary, drawing in particular on political science, economics and international relations. The principal debates in the current literature are indicated in the sections that follow. The methodological approach is summarised in the analytical matrix (Table 1) . In order to be tractable, the world system is broken down into six 'sectoral' vectors. Analytically each of these vectors relies on well-identified branches of the social sciences: thus vectors (1), (5) and (6) rely on political science and international relations, (2) on economics, (3) on political science, international relations and sociology, while vector (4) on climate change and energy blends economics and political science with crucial evidence from the physical sciences.
Conceptually the work programme will have 3 stages, as detailed below. This is a stylized ideal programme that will take some years and significant funding to be achieved. Precise selection and sequencing of different modules of work will be decided as a function of funding. However it is intended in any case to make an early start to establish the Global Matrix brand and operational capacity, if necessary on the basis of low-budget initial phases of work, and to secure matching funding in parallel with work in progress.
Stage 1 consists of outlining the stance of each major power in the six sectoral areas of the matrix. The values, aims and interests of these major global actors, as well as their approach to key global challenges, will be fleshed out in this context. Short 'initial conditions' papers will be drawn up for each cell of the matrix. These papers will be compiled by reviewing secondary literature and analysing official documents. In addition they will be based on semi-structured interviews with stakeholders for the main actors: state officials, politicians, journalists, business actors, civil society representatives.
In the matrix of Table 1 , five major actors are identified -China, the EU, India, Russia and the US. However there are other participants in the increasingly important G20, which we will bring into our work in a more limited and economical fashion, namely Japan and Korea, as well Brazil and South Africa from the 'BRIC' and 'BASIC' groups.
In addition the matrix includes a 'transnational' category, representing a wide range of transnational actors including interest and pressure groups: business (multinational corporations and business associations), non-governmental organisations (such as human rights and environmental lobbies), think tanks, religious movements and the globalised mass media. This transnational row in the matrix also has to take account of catastrophic 'events' that force political leaders to respond under the combined impact of such 'events' and pressures from non-state actors. 10 These elements may be difficult to synthesise in view of their heterogeneity and diffuse influence, yet they have to be brought into account to avoid overstating the weight of state actors. Stage 2 confronts these 'initial conditions' papers with a set of thematic papers on the dynamic driving forces in the world system, screening for instances for harmony or opposition between the major actors and transnational driving forces in the given sectoral fields of policy, and for cross-cutting synergies or tensions (e.g. impact of climate change on trade policy and migration), and potential flashpoints, where tensions could lead to conflict (see section 5.2 for more detail).
Stage 3 will use the sets of papers produced in Stages 1 and 2 to explore future systemic developments that are seen as a recommended course of action, and assemble 'world views' by actor and sector. The project coordinators will analyse areas of convergence and divergence, and assess how far the emerging multi-polarity might become consistent with a workable global multilateral order, or risk dangerous instability.
Initial conditions, drivers of change and world impact (Stage 1)
We now set out a short introductory account of debates and perceptions for each of the 'sectoral' vectors of the matrix, as introduction to Stage 1.
a. Political ideologies and regimes
Initial conditions. The incremental expansion in the number of democracies witnessed since the beginning of the 'third wave' has appeared, in the 2000s at least, to pause. A growing number of writers have argued that the liberal agenda is on the wane and a more realist outlook on the world is required. History suggests that there are no iron laws of democratisation, and trends can prove strikingly changeable. 15 We will investigate such complexity and what the competition in political ideologies means for the reshaping of the world order.
Impact on the world order. The under-determined nature of current political trends opens up a rich field of research. While the easy triumphalism of the democracy agenda in the 1990s was misplaced, much criticism now risks over-shooting. 16 Recent work has begun to suggest a more nuanced view of the supposed 'democracy backlash'. 17 The rise or reinvigoration of several regional powers and emergence of a multi-polar world divided along both East-West and North-South lines will mean complex changes that are hard to determine. Non-Western international development aid is a growing phenomenon; some of this offers the prospect of additional support for democracy, some risks neutralising the West's governance programmes.
A key debate will be over how different types of political regimes impact the changing world order and vice-versa. Figure 1) . Much has been made at the level of economic doctrine of the demise of the so-called 'Washington consensus'. 21 However, this 'consensus' view hardly constituted an economic ideology. It rather represents a set of policy prescriptions applied mainly by the IMF and the World Bank when dealing with countries in crisis facing large fiscal and external deficits and distorted financial systems, and over this there is little disagreement.
The one element of the Washington consensus that is being seriously reviewed concerns the regulation of financial markets. It is now generally agreed that there can be 'too much' financial market liberalisation. The key (so far unresolved) issue for policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic is at what point can a financial sector become too large or too unregulated. However this is not yet the main question for most emerging economies. 22
Drivers. The renminbi exchange rate issue is often considered a bilateral US-China issue because the renminbi is pegged to the US dollar. However, in reality, this is a global issue, with Brazil and India recently voicing their concerns in addition to those of the US and the EU. The core of the problem is the size of the Chinese current account surplus. While this has shrunk considerably, IMF projections indicate that it will start increasing again. Persistent Chinese export-led growth policy will impact on other emerging economies as well as advanced economies. For the mature economies the distribution of the 'burden of adjustment' created by the Chinese surplus depends, among other factors, on the strength of the euro against the dollar, which in turn depends on how the current eurozone crisis is resolved. This links to the issue of representation and voting rights in the international financial institutions (IFIs) and in particular to the role of China. The 'natural' solution to the reordering of the representation of Europe and the emerging economies in the international financial institutions is clear: an increase in the weight of China, alongside a unification of the euro area with a reduced overall weight.
Various calls for a new Bretton Woods system remain poorly specified. A practical step would be for the IMF and the WTO to take responsibility for determining damaging exchange rate misalignments and possible trade policy responses, rather than see these issues played out bilaterally between the US Congress and Treasury and China. Limits to the size and activities of banks are debated, but essentially as US and EU affairs. The rising powers favour an increasing role of the SDR (special drawing rights) as a reserve asset and numeraire for trade and finance, but this does not yet acquire strong momentum.
The crisis has pushed China and its Asian neighbours to look to each other more as economic partners. 24 While the Doha Round seems more stuck than ever, regional trade blocs and bilateral free trade agreements seem to progress and FTAs are proliferating across Asia. 25 Also interest in regional monetary agreements is increasing, as for example the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), which aims at improving regional monetary stability. 26 There is one specific 'sleeping issue' at present, namely the startling financial interdependence that has arisen between China and the US. Many analysts observe that the two parties have drifted into a state of mutual entrapment, which can only be unwound by a major current account adjustment, but which would come only with a corresponding exchange rate adjustment that would inflict great financial losses on China. 27 Grounds for unease seem to exist, given the unpredictability of both US Congressional actions and Chinese policies.
Chinese and Indian leaders see themselves as heading developing countries, with their leaders preoccupied with the internal priority of reducing mass poverty. However, these two most populous of nations seem not to share similar basic conceptions of economic organisation or governance.
Impact on the world order. The financial crash and recession of 2008-09 has already led to a significant revision of the rules for regulation of financial markets, but this is largely a transatlantic affair. The confluence of the economic crisis, the rise of Asia and the diffusion of economic power raises more fundamental global systemic questions: Will there be a return to the extended supply-chain, easy credit models of globalisation prevalent before the recession or the evolution of other patterns of trade and finance? Will new dynamics in monetary and trade policy regimes see a shift in the direction of regionalism at the expense of global regimes? How will rising powers seek to influence the policies of the IFIs? And will the US and the EU seek to reposition themselves while engaging with the rapidly developing 
c. Demography and migration
Initial conditions. Population projections reveal contrasting demographic trends at the global level. There will be continuing demographic expansion in Africa, India and the Americas through to 2050. However after 2030, China's population stabilises, as will that of the EU, in both cases with serious ageing, while Russia's grave demographic decline continues. These demographic contrasts will have profound consequences, driving a reassessment of migration policies. Together with policies aimed at selectively facilitating the entry of foreigners and controlling borders, major powers face the need to address the movement people (legal and unauthorised) through bilateral and multilateral talks on migration and border management. In recent decades, the migration agenda has highlighted the need for enhanced cooperation 28 and regular inter-state consultations on the mobility of people aimed at creating state-led mechanisms designed to influence migration flows. 29 This international agenda has gained momentum through state-led consultations in various regions, in which China, the EU and its member states, India, Russia and the US have played prominent roles, each with its own 28 Martin, Ph., Martin, S., and Weil, P. (2006) 31 However, RCPs have implied much more than the capacity to influence migration. They also develop guiding principles which become normative values shaping how the movement of people should be regulated and understood. It is questionable, however, how far these quite soft processes will stand up to possible catastrophic waves of migration, driven by extreme poverty and environmental factors.
Drivers.
Researching critically the respective goals, policies and interactions of the major powers should thus represent a first step in the enquiry into the drivers of global migration policies. However, states are not the only actors in the management of migration. Non-state actors play an increasing role in shaping governmental agendas, priorities and practices in the management of migration. 32 International organisations as well as multinational corporations have been mobilised in the design and implementation of migration policy over the last decade. 33 Most notably in Europe and the US, the outsourcing of migration controls to private contractors has gained momentum over the last decade, in principle in order to reduce costs, and enhance states' ability to respond to shocks and uncertainties (e.g. illegal border-crossing, mass arrivals of aliens). 34 But this also raises questions to be researched whether this outsourcing is imparting policy bias. 35 In addition, the nature of migrantsskilled vs. unskilled -is becoming an increasingly important question for regions such as Europe, which is both shrinking and ageing, and thus increasingly reliant on inflows of skilled labour. However at present 85% of unskilled labour from developing countries goes to the EU and only 5% to the United States, whereas 55% of skilled labour goes to the US and only 5% to the EU. 36 30 The first RCP was established in 1985, followed by many others after 1995, often as the result of specific events such as the fall of the Soviet Union and security concerns post 9/11 (International Orgainsation for Migration (see http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/regional-consultative-processe In Russia, China and India, the demographic/migration concerns have very different profiles. Russia is confronted by a dilemma: the economic need for immigration to compensate for demographic decline, but the limited societal absorptive capacity for immigrants for Central Asia, and concern over the prospect of Chinese migration into the depopulating Russian Far East. China seems now to reconsider its one-child policy in the face of a stagnating and ageing demographic prospects, while having to manage its huge internal rural-urban migration process. India seems set to overtake China as the most populous nation by 2050. Both China and India seem to manage important circular migration patterns, with return migrants bringing valuable economic skills for the modern economy.
Impact on the world order. The questions to be tackled involve several quite distinct themes: responses to domestic demographic developments, which may blend incentives/disincentives for child bearing with the migration variable; the need to anticipate responses to possible catastrophic migratory pressures; the search for compatible economic 'human capital' objectives given the competition for high-quality skills among advanced economies and the interests of developing countries in circular migration; and the policy implications of the security-industry's contribution to the technologies of border management.
d.
Climate change and energy Initial conditions. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol framework could be regarded as classic examples of an international regime in the making. 37 However this regime has weakened over the course of negotiations over the extension of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its first commitment period, 2008-2012, as witnessed in Copenhagen in December 2009. In particular the 'emerging powers' (in the 'BASIC' group) prefer to maintain the distinction between advanced and developing countries, whereas the US makes its own commitments conditional on commitments by all major polluters, the biggest of which is now China.
A limited achievement in the Copenhagen Accord was the acknowledgement that the increase in global temperature should be kept below 2° C. In addition in Copenhagen there was a tentative offer by developed countries to build up financial assistance to developing countries to $100 billion p.a. by 2020. 38 The Cancun conference in December 2010 at least confirmed that the UNFCCC process should continue. Initially the architects of the Kyoto Protocol envisaged the creation of a global carbon market in a top-down manner through country-based emission targets and the allocation of corresponding national allowances. 41 However the absence of a global cap-and-trade scheme has triggered concerns, especially in the EU, over the dislocation of energy-intensive industries to emerging economies. The alternative might be a 'bottom-up' approach reliant on national or regional schemes. 42 The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) foresees several options to link with other domestic cap-and-trade schemes in this way. 43
Drivers of change. Given the apparent deadlock of negotiations at the UNFCCC multilateral level, what factors could generate a renewed positive momentum? Awareness of the potential costs of inadequate policies have certainly advanced in recent years, for example the risks of increased drought and desertification in several world regions and flooding from the rise in sea levels in coastal regions. Experts predict that millions of people could become environmental migrants by 2050, but mostly internally rather than internationally. 44 The most dramatic scenario is that of the tipping point, in which the processes of global warming acquire self-intensifying and irreversible dynamics. As and when such evidence may become more visible and tangible, governments may be forced to act. Civil society, going beyond 'green' groups and including conservative and religious groups might reinforce this pressure. This could add to officially mandated norms with intensified private sector initiatives, or the 'bottom-up' processes already mentioned. 45
Impact on world order. For the particular purpose of our project, priority issues to be researched will be the cross-sectoral linkages, especially relating to trade and development 39 policies, yet including also larger questions such as energy security and notably access to energy. On the trade policy linkage, it is untenable politically to try to enact cap-and-trade systems that impose costs on companies operating in the U.S. or Europe only to have them shift jobs and pollution to countries such as China or India, which are reluctant to embrace binding emission reductions. Yet potential remedies, such as imposing additional "border charges" on carbon-intensive imports and subsidizing domestic producers, could lead to retaliation or challenges in the WTO. A comprehensive climate change regime could also require new trade rules in intellectual property, services, government procurement, and product standards. 46 Rapidly rising economies are relying on extensive use of oil and gas, as well as other resources. If China and India were to use as much oil per person as Japan does today, their demand alone would exceed global oil demand. These trends are also generating inflationary pressures as global demand drives up the price of commodities, and are simply untenable for a global economy of 6 billion people. Breaking the link between the production of wealth and the consumption of resources is an historic challenge, but also an opportunity to move toward entirely different patterns of consumption and competitiveness. The open question is whether this can be done both in terms of innovation but also in terms of governance. Yet failure to do so will have very costly consequences for future generations. The importance of energy sustainability on the international agenda will only grow as the international community addresses this long-term challenge. Moreover, other challenges stemming from climate change will arise and demand further international cooperation, particularly water scarcity, biodiversity, food security, and deforestation.
e. Strategic security
Initial conditions. The nature of international security has changed dramatically, altering the nature of the state and the global challenges faced by major powers. This has opened a set of questions regarding how China, the EU, India, Russia and the US act in the international arena. This can draw on three strands of IR theory.
The classical realist response has it that major powers act in order to protect their national interests: independence, territorial integrity and security. 47 They do so through military means as well as through economic instruments and diplomacy, pursued unilaterally, through strategic alliances, or just 'coalitions of the willing'. In an increasingly interconnected world, conflicts that once might have remained local disputes can have global impact. Unstable and ungoverned regions of the world pose dangers for neighbors and a setting for broader problems of terrorism, poverty and despair. The technology and knowledge to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction is proliferating among some of the most ruthless factions and regimes on earth. The Cold War threat of global nuclear war has diminished, but the risk of a nuclear disaster has gone up. Scientific advances have enhanced biology's potential for both beneficence and malevolence by state and non-state actors alike.
Impact on the world order. These trends have led to diverse repercussions. The international community has become more sensitive to human conditions worldwide. This has added to the weight in favor of humanitarian interventions, 56 multilateral institutions protecting human security, and universal jurisdiction (e.g. the ICC or International Criminal Tribunals). 57 More broadly, the rise of civil society has induced and legitimized transformational approaches to conflicts. 58 At the same time, transnational developments have spurred 'new wars', 59 where formerly localized conflicts acquire global proportions. These trends also mean that, while conventional military means are still heavily relied upon (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq) these are seen to be ill-equipped to deal with conflicts marked by rebellions, terrorism and crime. The changing nature of security challenges and responses of major actors will shape the evolution of global security affairs. In order to understand such impacts this project will select a set of empirical case studies (e.g., the Iranian nuclear question, Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East and Sudan).
f. World views and system
Initial conditions. The way in which different worldviews will interplay in shaping the new world order is a major issue to be addressed in this project. 60 Four issues stand out. The first relates to the very nature and structure of the emerging system, whether different actors regard it as multi-polar, non-polar or inter-polar, or as a combination of these three and other -Drivers of change: Shifts in power, heterogeneity of world powers, and role of transnational non-state actors.
-World impact: Uncertain impact of different world views on future of world order, including role of formal and informal multilateralism (from UN to G20).
paradigms. 61 This is about the distribution of power and influence in the system. 62 Mirroring the multi-polarity debate is the issue of hegemony in the international system, and the extent that the US's pre-eminence is waning. The main question here is how to foster order and stability, and provide global public goods, in a post-hegemonic (or post-American) world. 63 The second question concerns the different approaches to multilateralism. 64 Supposedly a driving principle and objective for the EU, multilateralism is more regarded as a means to an end (the pursuit of national interest) by the US and, arguably, often used as a rhetorical argument in the Chinese debate. Is multilateralism regarded as an objective in itself, or mainly as a means to a desired end? How do major powers view the relationship between multilateralism (rule-based international order) and multipolarity (emerging polycentric system)? Are the two mutually exclusive or compatible?
Third, the approach to regionalism is a critical test of the views of key actors on power and governance at large. In a nutshell, is regionalism regarded as a tool to impose power, to balance power or to dilute and domesticate power? 65 Is it viewed as a forerunner of multilateralism or as an impediment to it? How relevant is the European experience of regional integration in the eyes of others?
The balance between legitimacy and effectiveness in international governance frameworks is the fourth dimension that needs addressing. One argument is that emerging powers would seriously engage in global governance only if given adequate space at the table. 66 However, it is a matter for debate whether these powers are willing and able to take on greater responsibility for the management of common problems. Second, the redistribution of material power resources is accompanied by a shift, or perhaps a net loss, of soft power at the global level. The US and the EU may have not been using their resources wisely. It follows that alternative worldviews acquire relevance in a more competitive global market of ideas.
Third, the international system is growing more heterogeneous. For the first time in at least two centuries, major emerging economies like China, Brazil and India are still poor or very poor countries. As such, poverty eradication and domestic socio-economic development feature among the driving priorities of these countries, notably regarding climate change and energy security.
Fourth, non-state actors, including trans-national ones, influence the evolution of the worldviews of major powers over time, albeit more so in open societies than in nondemocratic regimes. Relevant players include large business, other economic stakeholders, civil society organizations, the media and public opinion.
Impact on the world order. The shifting balance of world views will define, among other factors, the scope for cooperation and conflict in the emerging world order. Will world views progressively converge, thereby enabling the reform of global governance structures, or diverge, possibly leading to competing multilateral forums? Will regional frameworks underpin a rule based world order or will they formalise competing spheres of interest? Does the co-existence of different worldviews suggest that informal governance frameworks will take roots as permanent platforms for regular exchange and consultation? What are the implications for traditional, more inclusive institutions such as the UN system and for the G20 and other informal groupings?
Dynamic Interactions (Stage 2)
Here the dynamic interactions between major actors and within and between major issue areas will be examined. The matrix structure of our project and accompanying roster of experts gives us the opportunity to explore these interactions systematically.
Inter-actor dynamics. Figure 2 is deliberately naively symmetrical, suggesting a set of equal sovereign actors who dominate the international system. In fact virtually all the bilateral relationships portrayed in the figure are the subject of 'strategic partnership' diplomacy, but the real nature and strength of these ties has to be assessed. Figure 2 thus serves as point of departure for identifying less symmetrical "realities" regarding both bilateral relations between actors as well as their interactions within regional and global multilateral institutions.
There are already several cleavages and alliances between the global actors shaping up and potentially being reinvigorated under the impact of multipolarity. Prominent already is the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, China), which appears to be driven by the goal of asserting its new global influence to balance the old G7, but whose unity of purpose remains to be tested. Climate change and trade policy negotiations have seen the emergence of the BASIC group (=BRIC plus South Africa, minus Russia), which claims a leadership role for the developing world. In response the old G7 democracies discuss the case for deepened political and economic coordination, with questions regarding their enlargement to a wider grouping of democracies. Regional groupings add a further dimension, evident not only in neighbourhood policies (e.g. of EU, Russia, India) but also in strategic regional alliances (e.g. East Asian cooperation or the Transatlantic community). Most striking of all is the emergence of a de facto G2, in which China and the US discuss key issues of global concern (exchange rate and climate change), risking to put multilateralism on these issues in suspense. The project will tease out current and expected future interactions between major actors within different issue areas, identifying flashpoints of conflict and domains of cooperation. Dynamic interactions 'live'. The G20 process is currently the most significant attempt to find more adequate methods of global coordination and leadership. Our project will therefore pay special attention to monitoring its progress, and this will be compared with the perceptions that emerge from the set of 'initial conditions' papers to be produced in the first stage of work. The G20 monitoring will:
• review the de facto constitution of the G20 for membership and leadership, • in advance of major G20 meetings, appraise the agenda and analyse the issues, • assess the results of such meetings.
Resolution (Stage 3)
While it would be premature to anticipate the conclusions of a first period for the project which would last about three years, we can nonetheless sketch the kind of outcome we would hope for, and how Stage 3 would proceed, with the following components contributing to a consolidated report:
• Each 'actor' team would assemble a final 'vision for the future' paper assessing where the multi-polar/multilateral system is and should be heading in the different policy areas, how institutions and systems should be improved, and how their 'actor' could contribute to it. This set of 'visions' would be subject of an overarching analysis testing for their compatibility or otherwise.
• The coordinators would further assess the adequacy or inadequacy of existing systems of multilateral coordination and institutions and their ongoing development in response to current challenges, and of the dangers inherent in their inadequate development.
• Based on the actors' visions for the future and this assessment of existing multilateral structures, the project coordinators would draw up a final synthesis of cooperative and conflicting visions for the future, pointing to where the system of world governance is heading, with identification of main driving forces, patterns of alliances, and opportunities for (Pareto-optimal) multilateral cooperation between actors and across issue areas.
• The coordinators would examine with the authors of the 'vision' papers how far it would be possible to go in terms of commonly agreed recommendations for the development of key multilateral institutions and modes of cooperation in the world system. These recommendations would concern principal elements in the global order, including the main multilateral institutions. Model solutions or reform packages will be indentified and tested for their general acceptability to our group. We cannot at this stage anticipate the degree of agreement the group could achieve.
• Recommendations would, finally, include proposals on how 'track 2' work of global think tank networks should be continued for the future.
extremism, 13/ Runaway computer intelligence, 14/ War that could end civilization, 15/ Risks to Homo Sapiens existence, 16/ A new Dark Age.
Annex. Key participants and their expertise Institutes
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, has a strong expertise in European foreign and security policies. Since 2000 it led the "European Security Forum" in partnership with the IISS, London, bringing together European, Russian, American and more recently Chinese scholars on major topics of global concern. 69 In 2008 CEPS published a research study relevant to that now proposed 70 , has been a leading source in Europe of analyses of the current economic and financial crisis 71 , and on the shaping of EU climate change policies. 72 It has been ranked consistently among the Top 10 world think tanks. 73 The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, is Italy's major research centre in the fields of international politics and security. Its main areas of interest are: Italian foreign policy, European integration, the Mediterranean and Middle East, transatlantic relations, international security and international political economy. IAI has highly-developed networks with research and policy institutes. The Institute disseminates its research results through regular printed and electronic publication outlets including its English-language journal (The International Spectator, Routledge). The Delhi Policy Group (DPG) is an independent Indian think tank founded in 1994, which seeks to build a non-partisan consensus on issues of critical national interest. It created a dialogue on the expanded nature of security in the framework of an inter-disciplinary matrix in South Asia. The DPG started a project in January 2007 to examine the emerging Asian strategic scenarios, with particular reference to the strategic dynamic between US and Japan, and the 'Rising Powers' (China and India).
